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This thesis involves a methodology for the development of
stand-alone artificial intelligence programs for inclusion in
a yet to be developed theatre level wargame for the
Conventional Forces Analysis Division (CFAD) of the Force
Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) of The
Joint Staff. It uniquely addresses some of the limitations
observed in the Tactical Warfare Model (TACWAR) , extending the
current research effort at the Naval Postgraduate School. The
artificial intelligence programs will simulate the decision
making processes that a theatre level commander would make
according to his perception of the environment, aware that his
intelligence may be incomplete and possibly incorrect. The
decision process is based on military doctrine derived from
Clausewitz, Jomini, and Napoleon, and involves allocating
reconnaissance assets, acquiring and validating intelligence




The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed
in this research may not have been exercised for all cases of
interest. While every effort has been made, within the time
available, to ensure that the programs are free of
computational and logic errors, they cannot be considered
validated. Any application of these programs without
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This thesis focuses on a proposed framework for the
development of stand-alone artificial intelligence (AI)
programs for inclusion in a yet to be developed theatre level
wargame. These AI programs will steer the wargame towards
making intelligent strategic decisions. This thesis uniquely
addresses some of the limitations observed in TACWAR (Tactical
Warfare) , a theatre level model currently in use in the
Pentagon.
B. METHODOLOGY
Specifically, the goal of this thesis is to introduce a
framework and discuss proposed AI submodules that simulate the
decision-making processes one might expect from a theatre
level commander based on his perception of incomplete and
possibly incorrect information. Additionally, the mechanics
of data flow, troop movements, detections, and engagement
results as well as structure of the theatre environment shall
be addressed and strategies discussed.
C. SCOPE OF THESIS
The proposed artificial intelligence programs are required
not only to function in the presence of incomplete
information, but also to determine if they are infected with
incorrect information. To pursue this, three AI modules are
anticipated. The first AI module considers the problem of how
a commander should best utilize his forces. He must attack
plausible targets for definite politico-military goals, yet
keep enough in reserve for unexpected events. A stand-alone
nonlinear integer assignment program delegates specific
mission objectives to specific theatre level units according
to the goals of the theatre level commander. The second AI
module addresses the problem of acguiring information and
confirming or qualifying existing information. The assignment
program allocates specific reconnaissance assets to specific
operating areas to gain intelligence against targets or
objectives. The last AI module is a network analysis program
identifying the optimal route of march for the individual
units based on three brigade level concerns.
A brief discussion of TACWAR and some of the problems
which motivated this thesis are presented in Chapter II.
Additional background on the origins of present day US
strategy is given in Appendix A. The battlefield,
reconnaissance, intelligence, and command, control, and
communications factors for the proposed framework are
discussed in Chapter III. Also included in this chapter are
proposed models for the commander's decision processes,
allocation of reconnaissance assets, and route of march
determination. Methodology demonstrations of these models,
including analysis of numerical examples, are provided in
Chapter IV. Finally, conclusions and areas of further study
are presented in Chapter V.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE TACTICAL WARFARE (TACWAR) THEATRE-LEVEL MODEL
The TACWAR simulation is a stand-alone, theatre level
combat model currently utilized by the Conventional Forces
Analysis Division (CFAD) of the Force Structure, Resources,
and Assessment Directorate (J-8) of the Joint Staff located in
the Pentagon.
TACWAR is one of the most comprehensive current models
involving engagements on a theatre level basis using
conventional, chemical, and nuclear assets. Its development
comes from a long line of other theatre level models.
One of the earliest was ATLAS (A Tactical Logistical Air
Simulation) , which used a firepower-driven representation to
simulate ground combat. In order to incorporate more
sophisticated warfare systems, GACAM (Ground Air Combat
Attrition Model) simplified the ground combat representations
and included comprehensive air-ground and air-air combat
activities. The development of increased computer memory
without a significant increase in simulation running time
allowed much larger models with higher degrees of detail. The
Institute of Defense Analysis Ground Air Model (IDAGAM) used
this advantage and improved upon GACAM by increasing its
resolution to include explicit interactions among ground
weapons and an increased data base of aircraft, weapon, and
munitions types. TACWAR is virtually the same as IDAGAM with
the addition of a supply network and additional submodules
incorporating nuclear and chemical activities to include a
target acquisition subroutine [Ref. 1].
TACWAR displays data in map and table format for analysis
of the comparative significance of various force sizes,
structures, and mixes. Its output aids in the assessment of
new concepts, doctrine, and theatre policy in the European,
Korean, and the Southwest Asian theatres. The most striking
display is the location of the FEBA (forward edge of the
battle area) on the map supplied at the termination of the
simulation run. This one bit of information holds the
greatest amount of significance in the analysis of the
particular theatre conflict studied. The tables created at
the end of each run display the level and time (within a
twelve hour window of resolution) of the attrition incurred by
each side, the force size and relative efficiency of armies,
as well as the exact geographical movement of the FEBA. After
a number of 15-2 minute runs, including various environmental
situations, an operator can perform sensitivity analysis on
the findings and create a detailed report on warfare for a
particular theatre and starting conditions.
The TACWAR environment includes conventional, nuclear, and
chemical munitions which can be employed theatre-wide.
Delivery systems include artillery, rocket launchers,
missiles, rockets, and tactical aircraft which can engage
various targets including combat subunits (both first and
second echelon) , air bases, supply points, and SAM (surface to
air missiles) and SSM (surface to surface missiles) sites.
Tactical air missions include CAS (close air support) , air
base attack, interdiction strikes, SAM suppression air defense
and escort missions. Attrition in the form of destruction and
chemical contamination can be directed towards ground weapons,
personnel, supplies, aircraft, facilities and shelters. The
model even includes the degradation of personnel and unit
efficiency resulting from the use of chemical protection
equipment [Ref. 1],
A number of limitations or concerns exist with TACWAR.
Foremost is that the model contains no stochastic processes to
simulate the uncertainties of war; it is a completely
deterministic algorithm. Although this is an excellent
feature that allows for replication of runs, it can bring
about false results, especially when decisions are resolved
close to their thresholds. During a simulated conflict, one
side is allowed the advantage of being the attacker only if
the force ratio is in its favor and this meets or exceeds a
predetermined and never changing threshold (unless by outside
operator intervention) . Should one side outweigh the other by
only a few troops, thus gaining the advantage, the
deterministic approach places an extremely high value on the
addition of a small number of troops. In this situation, the
addition of a platoon could turn the entire tide of the war.
A conflict is initialized with the decision of the
identity of the attacker. This decision is based on a force
ratio of one side's offensive combat power versus the other's
defensive combat power and vice versa. Provided the
calculated force ratio meets or exceeds its particular
threshold, the designated attacker from the previous cycle
retains the offensive. Another limitation is that these force
ratios are computed with the actual (ground truth) numbers and
not the theatre level commanders' perceptions of their force
compositions and strength nor their perceptions of the enemy.
Either intelligence and deception are not a factor in the
game, or all decisions are based on perfect intelligence with
a perfect ability to defeat the enemy's counterintelligence
efforts.
Another limitation is that the geography of the theatre is
divided into long corridors called regions along the most
common axis of movement. Movement on the battlefield is
constrained by these artificial corridors to uni-dimensional
avenues and can be pictured as rolling marbles toward each
other in a trough. There is no ability to flank unless the
operator intervenes. What occurs in one corridor is unknown
and does not affect the actions of a neighboring corridor,
though it may only be a few miles away. It is possible in the
simulation that during a Communist advance on Central Europe,
a particular regiment could become hung up in a small German
town, while its companion regiment only miles to the north
marches completely unopposed to Spain. Additionally, the
model is oriented around the concept of the FEBA. Since
weapons have extreme range and can reach deep into enemy
territory, the idea of a FEBA is giving way to the notion of
mass and location.
The primary MOE (measure of effectiveness) that motivates
the commanders' decisions in the model is restricted solely to
personnel and equipment destruction; the gaining of territory
is, in reality, a byproduct of conflict and not a motivator.
Clausewitz, in his study of warfare, listed three measures of
strategic effectiveness required for consideration in all
decisions. First, attack the will of the state and destroy
the government infrastructure and its ability to engage in
hostilities. Next, attack the will of the army and destroy
its military power and its ability to conduct war. Finally,
attack the will of the people and destroy their morale and
ability to support war. These concepts are further amplified
in Appendix A. Additionally, it is imperative to view the
acquisition of theatre territory as a MOE unto itself.
Lastly, in TACWAR there is no ready termination criterion
to the wargame. It simply continues indefinitely for as long
as the operator desires. A theatre level model, especially in
light of today's limited theatre level conflicts, requires the
capability to declare defeat or surrender whether based on
Lanchester attrition equations or political considerations.
TACWAR provides a representation of theatre level conflict
and assists in many of the studies and preparations for
conflict in certain areas of the world. As a model, it has
various advantages as well as disadvantages and can provide an
excellent source for more advanced conflict simulations.
III. THE MODEL FRAMEWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter addresses a proposed framework for developing
major components of the artificial intelligence programs. The
environment of the battlefield is examined and a data
structure introduced on which the AI subroutines can function.
The processes of reconnaissance and intelligence, maneuver,
and strategic theatre level decision making are discussed and
formulated. In Chapter IV, a model is presented to
demonstrate the reconnaissance allocation module and the
maneuver algorithm.
B. THE BATTLEFIELD
1. Representation of the Geography
The battlefield is divided into numerous hexagons similar
to a modern day board game. The major geographic features of
theatre level concern must be adjusted to fit the hexagons.
The geographic area defined by this shape would equal the area
required by the smallest theatre level unit. Depending on the
resolution required by the user, the definition of the
smallest theatre level unit can change. For this framework,
the basic unit is at the brigade level and aggregated to form
divisions. The advantage of hexagons is twofold. First, they
allow two-dimensional movement, an improvement over
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conventional one-dimensional models which utilized piston-like
corridors. Second, they shift from the idea of a FEBA to the
notion of mass and location, where the front and rear areas
are no longer used as reference points.
The battlefield, for all practical purposes, exists as a
network in a data base. The nodes represent the center of
each hexagon and the arcs indicate the routes of possible
movement from one hexagon into the adjacent six hexagons. The
hexagons are oriented such that they are consistent with the
main axis of movement in the theatre.
The data required at a node are stored in vector form and
consist of
• node identification number.
• latitude of node.
• longitude of node.
• fixed defendability (difficulty for the attacker to
maintain offense due to solely terrain attributes) : a
numeric scale that sets attrition values.
• variable defendability.
• fixed visibility: a numeric scale that sets detection




• current controlling force (blue, red, or neutral)
.
• blue perception of controlling force.
• red perception of controlling force.
• specific identification of unit.
11
• blue perception of unit identification.
• red perception of unit identification.
The information required for an arc is also stored in
vector form. Since all arcs are of equal distance, this bit
of information does not have to be stored, only implied in the
movement equations. The data base maintained for each arc
consists of
• arc identification number.
• fixed terrain type to affect rate of movement.
• variable terrain type to simulate weather effects.
Terrain types are divided into either heavy or liqht transport
roads, qood, fair, or bad off-road terrain, obstacle, and
liqht or heavy seas.
Note that in order to maintain a sense of consistency in
the model, the variable values of defendability, visibility,
and terrain type must be compatible. This is accomplished
usinq a weather subroutine which coordinates the impact of
these three values. In the data structure, every node is
accessible to every other node. Units may experience
difficulty traversinq arcs dependinq on the type of arc and
unit; however, innovation and determination in actual warfare
means there is always a way.
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2. Identification of Unit Types
Units are classified as ground, air or naval. A unit
identification number is assigned to a specific entity and is
recorded at the node of its present location. The unit
identification number refers to a data base file recording
such attributes as
• type of unit.
• force level (current number of personnel)
.
• level of aggregation.
• identification of units in the aggregation.
• current node identification number.
• current mission assignment (objective identification)
.
Units can be aggregated to form more powerful entities such as
brigades coming together to form divisions. Separation
limitations between units are determined using latitude,
longitude and simple trigonometry.
Military units are generalized into categories based on
their capabilities. For example, instead of F-14s, A-6s, and
F-117s, there are integrated strike packages and "lone wolf"
surgical strike aircraft.








Combat units are further classified as mechanized infantry,
(armor) , light forces (infantry, airborne or airmobile) , or
Special-Warfare units.
Air units are divided into three basic categories
characterized as fixed-wing jet, fixed-wing propeller, or
rotary wing to account for range, payload, and speed:
• early warning detection aircraft.
• air combat aircraft.
• transport.
Early warning detection aircraft are subdivided into seven
categories:
• forward air control (FAC)
.
• photographic reconnaissance.
• signals intelligence (SIGINT)
.
• early airborne warning (EAW)
.
• low altitude unmanned airborne vehicles (UAV)
.
• high altitude UAV.
• overhead satellite.
Combat aircraft include such categories as integrated strike
packages, surgical strike aircraft, combat air patrol (CAP)
,
and area bombardment aircraft.
Naval units are aggregated into five basic categories:
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• carrier battle group.
• surface action group.
• submarine units.
• amphibious assault group.
• naval transport.
3 . The Missions
Strategic or theatre level objectives are defined by
Clausewitz as
1. destruction of the government's ability to engage in
hostilities.
2. destruction of the military's ability to conduct war.
3. destruction of the people's will to support war.
4. physical control of theatre territory.
Sufficient attainment of these mission objectives will
lead to a victory condition in the simulation. Strategies
supporting this include
• isolation or destruction of control structure and
logistical base.
• destruction of lines of communication and foreign trade,
supply lines, and their intelligence network.
• denying enemy use of airspace, sea lanes, highways,
bridges and other transportation media.
• deception.
• psychological warfare.
• attrition of enemy warmaking capability and enemy
personnel.
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The theatre level commander executes these general strategies
through use of specific missions by air, ground, or naval
units. A discussion of the development of present day US
strategy (1980-2000) is offered in Appendix A.





Six specific missions involve ground-ground combat:
• attack.
• guard.
• advance to contact.
• withdrawal and destroy resources.
• enter reserve status.
• Spec-War harassment strikes.
There are nine categories for air combat units:
• combat air patrol.
• anti-ship missile strike.
• surgical strike.
• area bombardment.
• close air support (CAS)
.






There are nine categories for naval combat units:
• naval gun fire support (NGFS)
.
• naval Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) strike.
• anti-air warfare (AAW)
.
• naval blockade.




• mine counter measures.
• ASW.
C. RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE
1. Reconnaissance, Detection, And Intelligence
Reconnaissance is the stochastic process involving
detection of one unit by another. Detection is the
determination of the location of a unit and the resolution of
its identity and strength. Intelligence is the process of
relaying the information gained through reconnaissance to a
theatre level commander so that he/she can assign mission
objectives and priorities.
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In this framework, reconnaissance is channeled through
eight media:
• ground detects air.
• ground detects ground.
• ground detects naval.
• air detects air.
• air detects ground.
• air detects naval.
• naval detects air.
• naval detects naval.
Strategic reconnaissance is obtained primarily as a result
of airborne reconnaissance. This type of reconnaissance is
most valuable to the theatre level commander as it reveals
location, identification, and relative strength of enemy units
over a large portion of the geography. In some cases, it
extrapolates intent by revealing course and speed of movement
and possible strategic locations towards which the movement is
directed.
2 . Reconnaissance Assets
There are seven categories classifying reconnaissance
assets that differ only in three particular characteristics:
the probability of detection, the probability of
identification given a detection has occurred, and the speed
at which it can disseminate the information.
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• Forward Air Controllers are small aircraft, normally
single seat propeller driven planes. Used primarily to
spot for artillery fire, they have both a high probability
of detection and identification but are restricted by
short range. They have short information dissemination
time.
• Photographic Reconnaissance is conducted by low flying
very fast single seat jets to minimize the time over
target. They have a high probability of detection over a
long range, but their high probability of identification
is restricted to a short range. They have long
dissemination time, since the film must be developed and
interpreted by experts.
• SIGINT, or signals intelligence aircraft, search the
electronic spectrum for intelligence. They have a low
probability of detection; however, it extends for a long
range. Their probability to identify is high and enjoys
the same long range. They have a short dissemination
time.
• Early warning aircraft such as the Navy's E-2 or the Air
Force's AWACS aircraft carry a large airborne radar and
have a high probability of identification over a long
range, but a low probability of identification. They have
short information dissemination time.
• Low altitude unmanned airborne vehicles (UAV) are remote
controlled drones with cameras that can survey a small
area with a high probability of detection and
identification. They have short information dissemination
time.
• High altitude UAVs can survey much larger areas than the
low altitude drones but suffer a much lower probability of
identification. They too have short information
dissemination time.
• Overhead satellite reconnaissance has a medium probability
of detection over theatre range and a high probability of
identification. However, like the photographic
reconnaissance asset, it requires a lot of work and has a
long information dissemination time. An additional note
concerning satellite reconnaissance: due to the nature of
their orbit, it cannot be directed or maneuvered as easily
as other assets. Its coverage of an area is restricted to
those times the satellites are actually overhead.
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3. Reconnaissance Operating Areas
During reconnaissance operations, assets "hunt" or "orbit"
in specific reconnaissance operating areas with specific
geographic boundaries. The detection coverage area for a
given platform is determined from a template revealing the
affected hexagons; in reality, the template only needs to
define the required nodes. Different templates are required
to differentiate the various track profiles of platforms. FAC
or SIGINT platforms utilize an orbit which is relatively
circular, and accordingly, the shape of detection coverage is
uniform (see Figure 1) . A platform whose track traverses a
great distance such as a photographic run (see Figure 1)
requires a template covering a great distance in the direction
of movement but limited in its lateral view.
A FAC or SIGINT A Photo Reconnaissance
Template Tenplate
Figure 1 Various Reconnaissance Templates
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Each of the seven types of reconnaissance platforms has a
specific type of template. Theatre territory is overlaid with
numerous templates of each of the seven types displaying all
of the possible areas of reconnaissance operations. There is
no limit to the number of templates that can cover a
particular geographic area which represents the various
reconnaissance platforms that can search an area.
Reconnaissance by ground or naval units is more tactical,
since the detection equipment of these units does not offer
the same capabilities or characteristics as airborne units.
Templates are created to give uniform coverage around the
unit. Units which are aggregated with other units enjoy
enhanced ranges centered on each of the aggregated units.
Overlap of detection coverage areas is expected in this
situation.
Reconnaissance by Special-Warfare units is characterized
by high probability of location , identification, strength, and
intent for strategic purposes; however, they are limited by
short range.
4. Scheduling Reconnaissance Assets
In this framework, scheduling reconnaissance assets is
accomplished through a simple ranking scheme of reconnaissance
operating areas. As no reconnaissance asset can search in
another category's operating area, there is only the need to
determine which of its own operating areas should be scheduled
21
for search. Each of the operating areas is ranked according
to six specific MOEs:
• Probability of detection: an overall probability of
detection computed from the average of the individual
probabilities of detection for each hexagon. The node
values of fixed and variable visibility translate directly
to the probability of detection; a high value of
visibility relates a high probability of detection. The
higher the probability of detection for the operating
area, the more desirable it is to search there.
• Reconnaissance cycles since last glimpse: designed to
keep uniform coverage over all the operating areas. The
longer an area has gone unsearched, the more desirable it
is to gain an update from that area.
• Distance the operating area is from friendly units. It is
extremely important to have a confident picture of areas
close to friendly forces and the bulk of the
reconnaissance operations should be directed here. This
value is derived using simple trigonometry and the
latitude and longitude of the mid-point of the operating
area and forward friendly units. It is then multiplied by
-1 to give the notion of decreasing utility over distance.
• Distance the operating area is from main strategic avenue
of advance. As the theatre commander maneuvers his forces
through the battlefield, reconnaissance operations clear
the path. It is important to have a confident picture of
the regions close to this path. This value is computed
using the closest point of approach (CPA) of the midpoint
of the operating area to the proposed avenue of advance.
Again, it is multiplied by -1 to give the notion of
decreasing utility over distance.
• Variance in the estimated force sizes and components in an
area arising from recurring reconnaissance operations. As
detection and identification are stochastic processes,
different interpretations can occur. The larger the
variance in these interpretations, the more desirable it
is to search an area again to confirm the intelligence
picture.
• Probability of survival within an operating area
determines how liberal a theatre commander is when
assigning an asset to an area. A commander is hesitant to
send a reconnaissance platform to an area where there
exists a strong possibility of destruction. The value is
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based on the perception of what types of enemy units are
in an area and their inherent capabilities to shoot down
reconnaissance aircraft.
There are various methods that can be used to aggregate
the MOEs into an overall MOE; however there is currently no
universally accepted choice. For this model, the suggested
method is called normalization [Ref.7], where the overall MOE
is defined mathematically as
DESIREarea=£ WEIGHT^ ( J M0El )
'MOE
where \x is the mean of an MOE over all operating areas, o is
the standard deviation and i is a counter for the six MOEs.
A MOE whose standard deviation equals zero is assigned a
default value of zero. WEIGHT is a six element vector that,
when multiplied by the MOE values, emphasizes the importance
of one MOE over another.
The above method provides a number of beneficial features.
First, dimensionless values are created through division by
the standard deviation, allowing the combination of diverse
MOEs. Second, subtraction of the mean exposes the level of
deviation a particular operating area has above or below the
average over all the areas. A linear combination summed over
the MOEs for each operating area reveals how much a particular
area dominates or falls behind with respect to the average of
all the MOEs. Weighting the MOEs prior to summation imparts
varying levels of importance inherent to each MOE through a
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multiplicative transformation of the values. For example, if
MOE A were given a weight twice as large as that for MOE B,
then the importance of MOE A would be deemed twice that of MOE
B and have twice the impact during summation. Aggregated into
one MOE, the new values are easily ranked to determine the
best reconnaissance operating areas.
Though the values lose their ratio relationship, they
still maintain their interval definition. For example, if
areas one, two, and three received scores of four, two, and
one, respectively, it would be incorrect to say area one had
twice the utility of area two. All that could be said is that
area one exceeded areas two and three, and that the amount
area one exceeded two was twice that which area two exceeded
area three.
Constraints exist to protect reconnaissance crews from too
exhausting a schedule, keep the skies above an operating area
from getting overly crowded, and maintain a suitable reserve
force. This is performed by simply restricting or limiting
the number of reconnaissance operating areas the algorithm can
choose. The amount of restriction can vary depending on the
constantly changing environment the theatre commander faces as
asset availability changes and areas of importance shift.
A numerical example is presented in Appendix D using the
results of a program run described in Chapter IV.
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5. The Stochastic Process of Detection and Identification
within Operating Areas
The stochastic process of determining if detection has
occurred, given that the target is located within the
reconnaissance platform's operating area, is a function of the
individual probabilities of detection for each hexagon. A
systematic counting function explores each hexagon and a
random number generator is used to determine if a true
detection, false detection, or no detection occurred. The
probabilities of detection are based on variable and fixed
visibility as well as the perception of threat to the
reconnaissance platform. A hexagon with a high threat
associated with it has a lower detection probability since the
reconnaissance platform would be hesitant to approach within
harm's reach.
The process of identification given detection involves
identifying not only the unit type but also its size. Two
normal distributions are required. One is centered with the
mean at the true identity, surrounded by other unit types with
which it could be confused; categories farther out on the tail
are less likely to be confused with the detected unit. The
standard deviation defines the degree of misidentif ication.
The other normal distribution is centered with mean equal
to the true force size of the true unit or an equivalent true
force size of the misidentif ied unit. The standard deviation
defines the amount of error in determining the force size.
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Following this process, enemy units are categorized with
two attributes:
• perceived type of unit.
• perceived strength of unit (number of personnel)
.
The perceived type and strength of the enemy unit further
determines the perceived importance of the unit to the enemy
logistical base, and command, control, and communications
structure, as well as the threat to reconnaissance operations
within an operating area.
6. The Process of Intelligence Validation
Intelligence validation is the process of looking for
variance in the estimated force sizes and compositions of
detected enemy units. The mean and variance for each detected
enemy unit is computed from the numerous estimates from
reconnaissance operations. The mean reflects the current
perception of the enemy and the variance determines the degree
of uncertainty in this perception. A small variance is
evidence that the perception of the enemy equates closely to
ground truth. A large variance increases the desirability to
search an area again to substantiate and confirm the
intelligence picture.
A simple search algorithm can determine in which
reconnaissance operating area an enemy unit is located and its
associated variance of force size and composition. A unit
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that has not been detected or detected only once is assigned
a default value of zero. For force sizes, the variance is
divided by the true force size to lessen the impact of large
numbers. The average of this value over all the units in an
area is used as the area's MOE.
D. THE THEATRE LEVEL COMMANDER'S DECISION
1. The Strategic Action Model
The modern strategist of a theatre level engagement must
function within the guidelines of the limited and just war
(see Appendix A) . Still, his thinking must be in keeping with
that of Clausewitz; that war is an extension of politics by
other means. Continually interested in the destruction of his
opponent's military force, populace will and political might,
the commander will deploy forces to obtain the greatest
impact. Unlike his counterpart engaged in a protracted war,
the commander does not enjoy a surplus of time or supply and
must use a more Jominian approach of bringing the maximum
possible force to bear against the decisive point in the
theatre of operations. By denying his enemy strength and
operating upon interior lines of communication, he achieves a
decisive concentration of force. The limited war commander
does not have the ability to maneuver and must drive the
forces directly toward the objective, keeping close to a
preplanned axis of approach. All routes, whether singular or
multiple, terminate at the grand objective or the location of
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the decisive point. An engagement here, Clausewitz and Jomini
agree, brings victory.
A model of this strategy reguires five modules and two
data bases:
• reconnaissance.
• distance from centerline.
• distance from objective.
• MOE development.
• strategic action assignment.
The reconnaissance module is the assignment program
discussed in the preceding section that controls the
operations, actions, and efforts of the detection process.
Outputs of the reconnaissance module provide detection data in
two data bases: the list of indices and the strategic area
overlays to the map.
The first data base, the list of indices, is input for the
strategic action assignment module. Initially, all possible
objectives are assigned an index; there are four types:
1. terrain.
2. enemy units.
3. friendly units under siege from stronger enemy forces.
4. slack.
Terrain objectives reguire an outside operator to perform
a map study of the theatre and to initialize the system with
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all terrain features that have the potential to impact or
affect the outcome. Such features include hills, crossroads,
towns, permanent supply depots, natural chokepoints or
containment points, etc. Some terrain features are always
considered an objective such as a large power station, while
others require a specific set of conditions. An example of
the latter is a bridge. Far away from the engagement it has
no real value; however, if a large portion of enemy supply or
reinforcements require that bridge, it takes on new
significance.
In reality, both sides have a fairly clear view of each
other's fighting forces and what units comprise these forces.
To initialize a wargame with each side having a list of all
possible units they may face is not unreasonable. Neither
side initially knows the strength or location of these units;
that is the job of the reconnaissance module. As a
reconnaissance asset detects an enemy unit, the second type of
index (the enemy unit index) is activated and becomes an input
to the strategic action assignment module. If undetected or
incorrectly identified, the index will remain inactive or
another index will become active. Again, an outside operator
must initialize the system and load into the data base a list
of all enemy units along with a larger and more generalized
list representing degraded intelligence.
The third type of objective takes into account the
scenario of a unit becoming ambushed or overrun during an
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engagement. They cease to be an asset and become an objective
reguiring other friendly units to reinforce them. Every
friendly unit has the potential of being in this situation.
The final type of index, the slack index, is used when
none of the above apply. This option allows a unit not to
engage any secondary targets and just maintain its route of
march along the axis of approach. Also, this index is used
for those units which are either under siege or have been
heavily damaged. These units enter into reserve status, adopt
a strong defensive posture without movement, and wait until
reinforcements and supplies arrive.
The second data base contains the strategic overlays.
Similar to the templates for reconnaissance operating areas,
they determine the proximity of an enemy unit to prominent
terrain features implying intent towards that terrain feature,
enhancing the importance of the feature. If a detection asset
determines that an enemy unit is located within one of these
overlays, it activates a terrain objective index. Not only is
the size of the overlay important, but also the shape of the
overlay showing various routes of march or other accesses to
the terrain objective. A terrain objective can have multiple
overlays revealing a distribution of importance as the
location of the enemy unit changes in relation to the feature.
The next three modules perform simple but necessary
computations. The first module determines the CPA or lateral
distance an intermediate objective is from the centerline of
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the unit's avenue towards the grand objective. An outside
operator determines the grand objective of the theatre
commander; for instance, the invasion and conquest of an
enemy's capital or the relocation of the FEBA behind a
politically determined boundary as seen during the War in the
Gulf when the US grand objective was to force Iraqi forces
north behind the Kuwait border. Geographically, there will be
a natural avenue of approach toward the grand objective.
Secondary or intermediate objectives are also assigned;
however, a unit which pursues them and loses sight of the
grand objective violates Jomini's principle of concentration
on the decisive point. Distance away from the avenue of
approach is an important consideration for the theatre level
commander and information can be generated using simple
geometry and the latitude and longitude of the unit's hexagon.
The second module determines the distance between all
perceived objectives and all available assets. This
information is needed to ensure that assets engage objectives
closest to them. Again, simple geometry using the latitude
and longitude of the two hexagons is adequate.
The proposed strategic action assignment module is a
nonlinear integer assignment program. The objective function
is maximized to obtain the most benefit from the assignments
of assets to objectives. The nonlinear characteristic
represents the marginally decreasing returns expected from
multiple assignments to a particular objective. Putting three
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units on an objective does not constitute the firepower of the
three separate units as they interact in an environment of
limited space and aggregate to form a single larger unit.
The theatre level commander is constrained from allocating
assets beyond his resources. The formulation of this program
is as follows:
MAXIMIZE:
£<£ [BENEFIT^xASSIGN^] s )
subject to:
2y ASSIGNtj <> TOTAL i Vj2 1J
where: i=assets, j=objectives, and the exponent s is a shaping
parameter on the interval (0,1). ASSIGN is a matrix where
signifies no assignment and 1 defines an assignment. TOTAL
refers to resources and is normally a vector of ones,
indicating that a unit can only be assigned one objective;
however, some units such as strike aircraft can be assigned to
multiple sorties.
The benefit matrix (BENEFIT) is a conglomeration of nine
MOEs combined using the normalization technique into a two
dimensional matrix mapping friendly assets to objectives. The
MOEs consist of
• probability of success of an asset against an objective;
a scale determining the likelihood of success of a unit
against an objective. It is composed of three attributes.
First, a data base contains the expected success rate of
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a type of asset against a type of objective. Second, the
expectation is altered to reflect the current strength of
the unit (number of personnel) above or below that of the
generic unit in the data base. Third, the same is
performed for the perceived strength of the objective.
• distance an objective is from the centerline of the avenue
of advance is determined from the CPA module.
• distance between an asset and an objective.
• perceived amount of enemy logistical attrition determined
from the perceived importance of the enemy unit and the
probability of success.
• perceived amount of enemy command and control attrition.
• perceived amount of enemy personnel attrition.
• perceived amount of gained territory is derived from how
far friendly forces have advanced given victory for the
engagement.
Maximization here reveals the force mix where the greatest
number of objectives are engaged by the commander's primary
choice of units.
2. Procedure and the Mechanics of Military Engagements
The mechanics of military engagements is steeped in
procedure and doctrine. Once active units have been
identified and assignments given, the closest and strongest
closes in and engages while the remaining assets act in a
supporting role.
In this framework, the concept of attrition applies to
enemy systems and depots as well as enemy personnel. After an
engagement at time (t) , a force at time (t+1) is divided into
three distinct groups:
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• functional forces: these forces have the capability to
maintain hostilities in time (t+1)
.
• nonfunctional forces: these forces have been wounded
either physically or psychologically and cannot function
in time (t+1) . Additionally, they detract from the speed
of advance and the offensive capability of the functional
forces as they require constant medical attention.
• casualties: these are the forces that either have been
killed in the action or have left their forces to join the
opposing side. This second group is the main target of
psychological missions. They do not add to the offensive
capability of the force to whom they surrender. As more
personnel surrender, they induce others to follow suit or
at least become nonfunctional and detract from offensive
capability.
The force strength in time (t+1) is computed from the
functional forces minus a percentage of the nonfunctional
forces and the surrender forces.
E. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Command, control, and communications refer to who is in
charge of the command; his sphere of influence (who he/she
controls and how) ; and the medium through which he conveys his
ideas and information (his communications net) . Attacking the
command structure, as Clausewitz recommends, is an attack on
both the government and its military forces since it isolates
the forces by removing any coordination between them or
direction to them. Separated from any form of guidance, they
enter a more defensive posture and movement becomes stagnant.
The greatest impact of degraded communications occurs where a
unit encounters overwhelming enemy forces and requires
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assistance. In a state of degraded command and control, the
wrong reinforcements may be sent, or the unit may be
completely cut off and no reinforcements sent.
In this proposed framework, command, control, and
communications are not directly modeled, but rather the
effects are portrayed as a degradation of information flow.
In the strategic action assignment module, indices can be
assigned correctly, indicating perfect command and control.
They can be misidentif ied to a more general category depicting
a loss in communications; the greater the error, the greater
the loss. Additionally, the assignment can be delayed until
the next decision cycle. A complete breakdown occurs where no
indices are assigned, thus the fighting forces are isolated
from their command structure and remain static.
Specific aircraft and brigades are designated for command
and control functions. These units are primarily susceptible
to detection through SIGINT, overhead satellite, and
photographic reconnaissance platforms. Attrition of these
units temporarily stagnates the elements aggregated with them
until another command and control facility establishes
communications. A random number generator based on a normal
distribution about the correct index performs the assignments.
The greater the attrition, the farther out on the tails of the
distribution (a more general category) an assignment is taken.
Once attrition has attained a preset level, no further
assignments are made.
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F. DETERMINATION OF ROUTE OF MARCH
1. The Route of March Module
Movement through the simulated battlefield is accomplished
using a network of nodes and arcs created for the theatre and
variations of shortest path algorithms. Single-source,
shortest path algorithms are that family of heuristics used to
determine the path through a network and offers the minimal
cost of travel from a unique starting point to any other
point. All the arcs in this model have nonnegative costs
attached to them and are numbered for identification. The
nodes have no value assigned to them and serve to join various
arcs. The single-source shortest path algorithm uses a
"greedy" technique in its quest for the optimal path.
"The algorithm works by maintaining a set S of vertices
whose shortest distance from the source is already known.
Initially, S contains only the source vertex. At each
step, we add to S a remaining vertex v whose distance from
the source is as short as possible. Assuming all arcs
have nonnegative costs, we can always find a shortest path
from the source to v that passes only through vertices in
S. Call such a path special. At each step of the
algorithm, we use an array D to record the length of the
shortest special path to each vertex. Once S includes all
vertices, all paths are 'special,' so D will hold the
shortest distance from the source to each vertex.
"
[Ref. 5]
A subset of the single-source shortest path algorithms
deals strictly with undirected graphs in which there is no
directional restriction on the arcs. Movement on an arc in an
undirected graph can be in both directions, while in a
directed graph, movement is restricted to one direction. An
undirected graph is the data structure used to represent the
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geography of the simulated battlefield in this framework. A
spanning tree is a path which connects all the nodes in a
graph so that any node is accessible from any other node. The
only restriction is the graph must be acyclic (it cannot
contain any loops) . Figure 2 displays graphically the
difference between a cyclic and an acyclic graph. A minimum-
A Cyclic Graph An Acyclic Graph
Figure 2. Examples of Various Graphs.
cost spanning tree seeks out the path in this graph which
offers the minimal cost of the combined arcs. For this
framework, Kruskal's algorithm (order e log e) is preferred.
Kruskal's algorithm begins with a graph containing only
nodes. Systematically, the arcs are introduced into the
graph. The process starts with the arcs of least cost and
continues with those of increasing cost such that a loop or
cycle is never constructed. The process continues until every
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node is included in the graph. An example is offered in
Figure 3.
Figure 3. Sequence of Edges Added by Kruskal's Algorithm
[Ref. 5].
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2 . Tactical Concerns
Having received orders from the theatre level commander
(simulated by the strategic action assignment module) , a
brigade commander is faced with maneuvering his forces to
achieve the assigned objective. Kruskal's minimal-cost
spanning tree algorithm simulates this decision-making
process.
The most expedient route is strictly a map study and seeks
to minimize the time required for travel. Contact with the
enemy will cause both a loss of personnel and time, and this
must be weighed against the increased time of maneuver.
The route offering the greatest degree of stealth is the
one where the smallest probability of detection exists. A
path on which the variable and fixed values of visibility are
minimized is such a route.
The most secure route is the path on which the unit does
not make contact with the enemy. Nodes where enemy units are
detected are temporarily removed from the network. Kruskal's
algorithm determines the shortest path to the objective
without travelling through these nodes or on any of the
associated arcs.
This chapter introduced and discussed a proposed framework
for the development of AI modules for a future theatre level
simulation. A demonstration of the reconnaissance allocation





Demonstration of the methodology used in this proposed
framework is limited to the reconnaissance allocation module
and the movement module. For this demonstration, it is
assumed the combat unit has already been assigned its
objective. The scenario consists of a field of eleven
hexagons with two reserved for the objective and the initial
location of the combat unit (see Figure 4) . The combat unit
has to cross the three by three grid to reach its objective in
the minimal amount of time using one of two movement profiles;
most secure where enemy contact is not permitted or most
expedient where enemy contact is permitted but must be
compared to the increased travel time of maneuver. Possible
enemy units are located in some of the hexagons; however,
their number and disposition are unknown. The combat unit has
three similar reconnaissance assets to explore any of the nine
hexagons. The unit must determine which three areas it must
explore and then resolve the route of march.
B. THE PROCEDURE
The initial runs of this model were performed using the
most secure path. The network and probability distribution
over the hexagons appear in Figure 5. Nodes in the network
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Figure 4. The Battlefield.
are considered geographically equidistant from each other.
The values displayed in the network represent the amount of
travel time due to terrain the combat unit encounters moving
over specific arcs. The most secure path considers and
minimizes the total amount of time from the current node to











Figure 5. Network and Probability Distribution.
unit is detected, that node and the six associated arcs are
removed from the system and the algorithm is run again to find
the new shortest path. The most expedient path assumes that
any enemy engagement incurs a time penalty of one unit. This
is added to the arc or arcs immediately following the node
where the engagement occurred. For this demonstration, the
penalty for personnel lost is calculated from a one to one
loss ratio with the enemy. For example, if an enemy force of
200 is detected, the perceived loss is 200 friendly casualties
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as well as 200 for the enemy. The penalty for friendly
personnel lost is transformed from personnel units to time
units by multiplying by 1 time unit per 200 personnel units.
This value is also added to the arc or arcs immediately
following the affected node.
The probability distribution displays the probability that
a reconnaissance asset detects an enemy unit in a particular
hexagon. An assumption is made that the three reconnaissance
assets and all the enemy units are of the same type. The
probability distribution strictly refers to the probability of
detection due to terrain. For this demonstration, the ability
of the reconnaissance platform to identify unit strength given
a detection is assumed independent of terrain and thus is
equal over all hexagons. It is normally distributed with mean
equal to the true force size of the enemy and a standard
deviation of 20 percent of the true force size. The standard
deviation refers to the amount of error inherent to this
platform and is representative of many true reconnaissance
platforms.
Six MOEs described in Chapter III are used in the
reconnaissance allocation module:
1. The ability of a reconnaissance asset to detect an enemy
unit within a hexagon; that is, the probability of
detection of the enemy.
2. The number of reconnaissance cycles since the last
glimpse. This is a counter which increases by one for
each reconnaissance cycle. For those hexagons where a
reconnaissance asset was sent or the combat unit had
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The geographic distance a hexagon is from the current
location of the combat unit, computed by counting the
number of hexagons from the current location of the
combat unit to the particular hexagon.
4 The geographic distance a hexagon is from the intended
path of the combat unit, computed by counting the number
of hexagons from the particular hexagon to the CPA of the
intended path.
5. Variance of the estimated force size detected within a
hexagon. The variance of perceived force size is
computed for each hexagon. A default value of zero is
given to those hexagons that either have not been
searched or searched once. The larger the variance, the
more desirable it is to search that hexagon.
6. The perception of a reconnaissance asset's ability to
operate within a hexagon and not be destroyed by enemy
fire is simply the perception of what type of enemy unit
is located there. A default value of 0.7 is assigned to
all hexagons prior to search reflecting an assumption
made in total uncertainty that in each hexagon there is
a 30 percent chance that the reconnaissance platform will
be lost to hostilities. When an enemy unit is detected
the value drops to 0.5; conversely, if no enemy units are
detected this value jumps to 0.9; a ten percent chance
that the asset will still be lost to a previously
undetected enemy unit. These values slowly return to 0.7
at a rate of 0.1 per two cycles. This represents the
reduced confidence of the intelligence picture as enemy
units may move from one hexagon to another. The values
are representative of values used in the real planning
and scheduling of reconnaissance assets.
A program written in APL (see Appendix C) performed the
normalization process, reducing the six MOEs for each of the
nine reconnaissance areas (54 total) to one MOE for each of
the areas. From the nine resulting values, the algorithm is
restricted to choosing the three largest for the three
reconnaissance assets and these are the primary three choices
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for reconnaissance operations. A numerical example of cycle
two from program run two is given in Appendix D to further
illustrate the normalization process.
For the example used to demonstrate the methodology, the
system was initialized with the friendly combat unit at node
zero and stationary enemy units permanently located at nodes
eight and nine (see Figure 4) . Both enemy units have a force
size of 1000. The initial shortest path runs along the right
side of the field through nodes three, six, and nine.
For analysis, tables are supplied in Appendix B. The
first row shows the hexagons involved in the reconnaissance
decision. The last row reveals the desirability of sending a
reconnaissance asset into a particular hexagon; the largest
three values depict the hexagons where reconnaissance
operations are directed. The middle six rows show the raw MOE
data.
Four runs were conducted with this scenario. The first
used unweighted MOEs, directed movement along the most secure
path, and operated in an environment of perfect command and
control where reconnaissance information arrived before
movement into another hexagon. The second run differed from
the first in that weighted MOEs exhibited the varying degrees
of importance inherent to each MOE. The third run explored
the effects of degraded command and control as information
arrived at a much slower rate: the combat unit traversed two
hexagons before receiving any updated information. The final
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run was a shift in mission profiles. Instead of moving along
the most secure path where the enemy was to be avoided at all
times, movement was directed along the most expedient path
where enemy contact was permitted.
C. ANALYSIS
Prior to any reconnaissance action, the initial optimal
path ran along the right side of the field through areas
three, six, and nine. The number of cycles since the last
glimpse equaled zero for each hexagon, there were obviously no
inconsistencies and the perception of a reconnaissance asset's
ability to operate safely within each hexagon was initialized
to 0.7.
1. Program Run One
Program Run One consisted of unweighted MOEs, used the
most secure path, and reconnaissance occurred before each
hexagon movement.
Cycle one, shown in Table B.l, directed reconnaissance
operations to areas three, six, and nine. Areas three and six
were identified as the most desirable with areas nine and two
being the next most desirable. All of these choices were
logical as they intently explored those areas near the combat
unit and along its intended path. An enemy force perceived to
be of size 1300 was detected in area nine shifting the optimal
path to (3, 6, 5, 8, objective) from the original (3, 6, 9,
objective) . The combat unit moved to area three.
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Cycle two, displayed in Table B.2, directed reconnaissance
to areas two, five, and six. Area six was the only clear
numerical favorite. These choices still concentrated
reconnaissance in the immediate area and close to the intended
route of march; however, area zero was considered more
desirable than eight. Rather than search area zero which
appears behind the combat unit, area eight would have been a
better choice since it was closer to the intended path. Area
zero was preferred primarily because of its close proximity to
the combat unit. The model did not recognize this hexagon as
being behind the unit; however, had the unit needed to
retreat, this hexagon would have been required and in reality
be in front. A characteristic of multi-dimensional movement
is an alteration to the concept of "in front" or "behind".
"In front" does not necessarily refer to the geographical
direction towards the objective. In the undirected graph
proposed for this framework where movement is restricted to
the optimal path, "in front" refers to the next node in line
towards the objective. "Behind" is the node on the exact
opposite side. No detections occurred and thus there was no
change to the optimal path (6, 5, 8, objective). The combat
unit moved to area six.
Cycle three, displayed in Table B.3, directed
reconnaissance to areas two, three and five. Area five and
two, the only numerically prominent choices, were logical;
area three was far from the intended path and search there did
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no good. Area eight was tied in desirability with area three
and a random draw chose between the two. In this scenario,
areas seven, eight or nine were better choices than three;
however, area three was chosen solely for its high sense of
safety (probability of survival within hexagon three equaled
0.9). A weighting scheme could have expressed the increased
importance of search along the intended route of march and
directed operations towards those areas. A weighting scheme
emphasizing proximity to the intended path was introduced in
the next program run with a noticeable improvement. In cycle
three, no detections occurred and there was no change to the
optimal path. The combat unit moved to area five, now one
hexagon away from area eight and an undetected enemy force.
Cycle four, shown in Table B.4, directed reconnaissance to
areas six, eight, and nine. A better allocation would have
been to choose area seven over area six. Reconnaissance
operations were never directed to area seven due primarily to
a low probability of detection (0.5). Again, a weighting
scheme could reinforce the importance of area seven's
proximity to the intended path. An enemy force of 700 was
discovered in area eight and 1100 in area nine. The optimal
path changed to a route from area five to seven and then to
the objective.
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2. Program Run Two
Program Run Two consisted of a weighting scheme for the
MOEs, used the most secure path and reconnaissance still
occurred before each hexagon movement. A vector (1, 4, 2, 5,
1, 2) was multiplied against each column in the matrix of
normalized values before they were summed. This weighting
scheme emphasized the importance of searching those areas
along the intended route of march (MOE 4) and attempting an
equal amount of coverage over all areas (MOE 2)
.
No change occurred between cycle one of this program run
(Table B.5) and that of program run one (Table B.l). A force
size of 900 was detected in area nine.
Cycles two, three, and four (Tables B.6-B.8) showed a
marked improvement in reconnaissance allocation. In cycle
two, reconnaissance was directed to areas five, six, and
eight. An enemy force perceived to be 12 00 was detected in
area eight, shifting the optimal path to (6, 5, 7, objective).
Reconnaissance operations in cycle three were directed to
areas two, five, and seven. Now the allocation algorithm had
completed its search of the hexagons along the optimal path.
The weighting scheme directed the focus of the allocation
algorithm towards sweeping a safe path to the objective. This
was an improvement over the last program run where area seven
was never searched.
Cycle four directed reconnaissance toward keeping equal
coverage of hexagons near the intended route. Areas four,
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seven, and nine were searched. The reconnaissance asset
reacquired the enemy force in area nine; however, it now
perceived the force size to be 1100. Before this
inconsistency could become an influence, the combat unit had
achieved its objective.
3 . Program Run Three
Program Run Three (Tables B.9 and B.10) consisted of the
same weighting scheme for the MOEs, used the most secure path,
and to simulate degraded command, control, and communications,
reconnaissance occurred once for every two hexagons of
movement.
A degradation of command, control, and communications
cannot be planned; it must simply be accepted and the
directives of the unit commander followed. In this scenario,
the combat unit expected reconnaissance information at each
hexagon before further advancing. When it did not arrive, the
unit had to operate on its best information and make the
advance based on old information. The reconnaissance platform
performed its duties, supplying information the combat unit
required before advancing only one hexagon.
Again, cycle one was the same and an enemy force of
perceived to be 1100 was detected in area nine. As in the
other two program runs, the optimal path became (3, 6, 5, 8,
objective) . Because of the unit's inability to gain
intelligence at each juncture, the combat unit advanced
50
through area three to area six. The reconnaissance allocation
module identified two, five, and eight as the next series of
hexagons. This was an appropriate choice assuming, as the
model did, that reconnaissance information would arrive before
movement into the next hexagon. The unit now advanced two
hexagons; it outran the intelligence coverage and ultimately
moved through an unexplored area seven.
Though the team of the reconnaissance platform and the
combat unit was able to achieve the objective, it is clear
that the performance was not equal to that of program run two
where they operated in an environment of perfect command,
control, and communications.
4. Program Run Four
Program Run Four (Tables B.11-B.14) consisted of the same
weighting scheme for the MOEs, perfect command, control, and
communications where reconnaissance occurred before each
hexagon movement, and switched mission profiles to the most
expedient path.
Perception of enemy strength had a heavy impact in this
program run. Enemy contact was permitted and Kruskal's
algorithm had to weigh the perceived benefits of making
contact or outmaneuvering the enemy. As perception of force
size changed, so did perception of the optimal path. Because
Kruskal's algorithm minimizes the time required to reach the
objective, a multiplicative transformation was used to convert
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the units of personnel to time with a ratio of one time unit
to 200 people. In essence, a sacrifice of 199 people was
viewed as better than the sacrifice of one time unit. It was
assumed that an engagement of any size would cost an
additional time unit.
Cycle one directed reconnaissance to areas three, six, and
nine, as in all the previous program runs. A force size of
1500 was detected in area nine and travel through the area
incurred an additional 8.5 time units. Kruskal's algorithm,
using the most expedient path, minimized the time required and
chose to transit through area eight.
Cycle two directed reconnaissance to areas five, six, and
eight, where a force of 800 was found in area eight. The
additional penalty of 5.0 time units for travel through area
eight did not outweigh that of area nine, nor was travel
through area seven any better, so there were no changes to the
optimal path. The combat unit moved into area six.
Reconnaissance in cycle three was directed to areas two,
five, and seven and no detections occurred. Consequently
there were no changes to the optimal path, and the combat unit
moved to area five.
Cycle four directed reconnaissance to areas four, eight,
and nine. The force in area eight was now perceived at 1400
while in area nine it was estimated to be only 700. The
penalty for area eight was 8.0 which outweighed the penalty of
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4.5 for area nine. Kruskal's algorithm changed the optimal
path to travel through area nine and then to the objective.
Perception of the environment played a heavy role in the
decision making process. The unit commander maneuvered
forces, constantly attempting to minimize the amount of time
required to reach the objective. As reconnaissance
information changed the commander's perceptions of the enemy





It is not appropriate to aggregate all the styles and
environments of war into the one, all-inclusive theatre level
warfare simulation. In order to sufficiently portray all of
the conditions, artificial intelligence programs for each
style of commander in each state of war are required. It is
adequate to house the simulation in a singular data structure
representing the battlefield, and then activate a particular
AI algorithm as the situation unfolds.
There is more involved with a theatre level decision than
just a comparative analysis of attrition, as performed by most
theatre level simulations. Other measures of effectiveness
are equally important, such as the impact of an action on the
enemy's logistical base or command structure. A proper
theatre level simulation must quantify and include these other
MOEs along with the traditional MOE of attrition.
The state and condition of the theatre environment impacts
heavily on the importance of MOEs in their relation with each
other. Enemy attrition is not an important MOE in a climate
of guerrilla warfare, where the desire is, rather than to make
contact, to tax the enemy's logistical reserves into
exhaustion. A theatre level simulation should allow for these
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various climates and adapt MOE use to support proper
decisions.
A theatre or unit commander is never able to make
decisions based on perfect ground truth; it is always on his
perception of the environment. He must utilized his
intelligence gathering assets to build an accurate depiction
of the surroundings. Perceptions impact heavily on his
decisions. During the final program run in Chapter IV, the
constantly changing perception of force size between two areas
caused Kruskal's algorithm to constantly switch between two
paths. This variability accurately reflects a commander
"fine-tuning" operational plans as newly arriving intelligence
updates his perception of the environment.
Two dimensional movement better represents reality in the
maneuvering of forces over ground. Maneuver is an integral
part of theatre level warfare and cannot be ignored. The
program runs in Chapter IV displayed clearly the importance of
two dimensional freedom of movement as the combat unit
maneuvered its way around the two enemy units in order to
achieve its objective. Kruskal's algorithm identifies the
shortest path that the unit commander would obviously elect to
maneuver forces and is adaptable to reflect changing mission
profiles or tactical concerns.
Command, control, and communications are important
elements to the decision making process. Degradation causes
information to become "trapped" at various locations along the
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information flow creating either a poor decision based on
incomplete or faulty reconnaissance or a misexecution of plans
because orders never arrive. Complete isolation of the
command structure from receiving intelligence or directing its
forces can halt any ability to effectively prosecute the war.
The effects of command and control must be included in a
theatre level model if it is to properly simulate the theatre
level decision process.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
There are numerous areas for further study. First and
foremost is study of different styles and states of warfare
from some of the other classical strategists in various
theatres of operations. Significant effort has to be put into
proper MOE identification and development to satisfactorily
reflect the desires of a particular commander.
A possible problem with any shortest path algorithm is
that it optimizes the entire network. Kruskal's algorithm
needs to be limited to optimizing only the local area to
reduce the amount of computational effort.
A working copy of the Joint Theatre Level Simulation
(JTLS) is in the War Lab in Ingersoll Hall, NPS, Monterey
California. It is written in SIMSCRIPT, based on hexagons
overlaid on a network, and operates on the theatre level;
however, it requires two people to operate; one to be the blue
commander and one to be the red. Incorporating AI into this
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model may save time and effort as most of the required
structure already exists, and the model is highly distributed.
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APPENDIX A
ORIGINS OF PRESENT DAY US STRATEGY (1980-2000)
A. WHAT IS STRATEGY?
"Strategy," as interpreted by Dennis Hart Mahan (USMA
1824) , is the art of "directing masses on decisive points, or
the hostile movements of armies beyond the range of each
other's cannon" [Ref. 2]. Written during the infancy of US
policy, he reflected many of the ideals of strategy from
Antione Henri, Baron of Jomini (1790) , who proposed that "the
basic tenet of strategy is a simple one, the necessity to
bring the maximum possible force to bear against the decisive
point in the theatre of operations while the enemy can muster
only an inferior part of his strength there" [Ref. 2].
Jomini 's emphasis on the decisive point, permitting domination
of the theatre, changed the focus of the then modern concept
of warfare from destruction of the enemy's armies in a
Napoleonic style to the more conventional eighteenth century
style of a contest for control of geographic locations.
"Napoleon," Jomini referred, "seemed convinced that the first
means of effecting great results was to concentrate above all
on cutting up and destroying the enemy army, being certain
that states or provinces fall of themselves when they no
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longer have organized forces to defend them" [Ref 2]. His
interpretation was fairly accurate, for in Napoleon's own
words, "There are in Europe many good generals, but they see
too many things at once. I see only one thing, namely the
enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident that
secondary matters will then settle themselves" [Ref. 2],
When one discusses modern strategy, three names stand out:
Napoleon, Jomini, and Clausewitz. In this model, the
teachings of these three are employed in the development of
the strategic policies of the simulated theatre level
commander.
Napoleon emphasized numerical strength, deep strategic
penetration, and rapid concentration of force. His perception
of effectiveness was to strike "at the core of his opponent's
power. Once the enemy's main armies were defeated, and
perhaps also once his administrative and economic centers were
occupied, all else was likely to follow" [Ref. 3].
Jomini prescribed offensive action to mass force against
weaker enemy forces at some decisive point "whose attack or
capture would imperil or seriously weaken the enemy" [Ref 3].
Clausewitz viewed war as "merely the continuation of
policy by other means" [Ref 3]. To him, war was composed of
three elements: "violence and passion; uncertainty, chance,
and probability; and political purpose and effect" [Ref 3].
The first element concerns mainly the people and their will,
the second the commander and his military forces and the last
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"is the business of government alone" [Ref 3]. To attack
these embodiments would be to gain victory through a
concentration of the elements.
Many theories of strategy exist and can be interpreted for
any number of hostile situations, but a question still
remains: what is strategy? Concisely put, strategy is the
art or science of hostile action and how one uses assets to
achieve victory during action.
B. ORIGINS OF US STRATEGY
General George Washington was the first to create a US
strategy during the War for Independence in the mid to late
1700 's. His style of warfare and options for strategy were
greatly limited and thus heavily shaped by the environment of
military poverty, which was the state of the colonies.
Greatly outnumbered by the British in manpower, training, and
technology, and forced to fight one of the first total wars of
the modern age, Washington opted for a strategy of attrition
over time. The revolutionary war was a new style of war as
compared to eighteenth century Europe. Conventionally, most
wars between states or countries were limited, for if the
European states had "waged economic war against each other by
destroying each other's resources [they] would have endangered
excessively the whole precarious financial and economic
stability of early modern Europe and thus would have imperiled
everybody..." [Ref. 2]. In the new world, this threat did not
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exist, so the British were free to embark on a strategy of
annihilation attempting to extinguish the very existence of
the colonies. This forced the colonists into a new style of
warfare: the total war. Washington's hopes were to adopt a
strategy of guerrilla warfare and thus test the endurance of
the British. Washington proved successful, and the prevailing
national strategy of this newly recognized country was to rely
on its distance from all other possible invaders to deter
advances strictly for logistical reasons, and if invaded, a
war of attrition instead of direct confrontation would push
the invaders beyond their endurance and thus into defeat.
This strategy proved successful throughout the next century;
however, it still emphasized the rationale that America would
never be involved in a limited engagement as in eighteenth
century Europe, and that all its hostilities would be total in
nature.
America's introduction to a limited war came during the
mid 1800 's when Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor invaded
Mexico for the express purpose of the annexation of Texas.
Scott's strategy was a political one which did not include the
complete destruction of the Mexican army. He gave strict
instructions for the conduct of the campaign, such as to
respect the rights of the Mexican territory, people, and
culture, and to confine the bloodshed and suffering strictly
to the armed forces and away from the civilian populace.
Scott did not seek to involve all of the Mexican population or
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its destruction as demanded by the doctrine of total war, but
sought only to capture Mexico City and convince the government
of the futility of protracted war. The concept of limited war
was forgotten as a part of US strategy for the next hundred
years as America was involved in the Civil War, and two global
wars, World War One and World War Two.
The 1950 's saw a new emphasis towards the adoption of a
strategy based on limited warfare. The environment of the
post World War Two world was the primary source of this
interest. World War Two was a total war subject to open-ended
goals accomplished through unrestricted means. Society as a
whole had been mobilized, and the normal economic structures
altered. Total war leaves only options of no-war/total-war,
where war is to be avoided at all costs, but if unavoidable it
is to be pursued with a vengeance. The concept of a limited
war with the mobilization of a limited amount of assets for
limited objectives sought to bridge the gap between the no-war
and total-war positions. The advent of the nuclear age
allowed the atomic weapon to wreak havoc as never before seen.
It became clear that a style of warfare had to be developed
that would not require the use of such destruction. Limited
warfare, now viewed as strictly an extension or continuation
of politics by other means does not permit the loss of control
of hostile implements or operations and thus would not
advocate the extreme destruction of the enemy's forces unless
it was found politically desirable.
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The Korean War was the first war of the twentieth century
to be fought within the doctrine of limited warfare. Its
motivation was a simple strategy stemming from the US
containment policy. In defense of the "Free World," the US
directed its military force not towards a direct confrontation
or entry into the Communist World, but towards limiting the
expansion of communism into surrounding areas. A policy of
hostile engagement for the acquisition of limited goals
allowed the US containment policy to function without forcing
entry into total war.
Just and limited war, as proposed by Jomini two hundred
years ago, is the closest theory of strategy from the classic
thinkers that resembles that of present day US policy. It is
understandable that present day goals, results, and concerns
of warfare reflect closely those of Jomini 's Europe, the only
difference being one of scale.
C. PRESENT DAY US STRATEGY (1980-2000)
US strategy today conforms to the guidelines for conduct
of just and limited warfare. Of primary concern is that "the
application of armed coercion is permissible only insofar as
it advances the political purposes of war. A limited war,
then, is a war in which political ends always determine
military means" [Ref 4]. The impact of these two statements
is great. First, it implies that military action shall be
restricted to the amount believed necessary by a political
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controlling force. Economy of force, or the use of force
which contributes to the ultimate objective of defeating the
enemy's armed forces, is to be pursued to the greatest extent
possible. Military objectives shall be limited to only those
which serve to achieve the overall political goal. These
objectives shall be pursued in the most expedient means
possible to guard against protracted hostilities. Open
channels of communications between belligerent nations must be
maintained. As limited warfare has a large political
component, political bargaining and discussion play a key role
in limited hostilities. Direct confrontation between
superpowers and first use of nuclear weapons are to be avoided
at all cost since they would surely escalate the limited war
to total war with all its destructive potential.
Great pains must be taken to ensure that the US, in
pursuing its limited warfare policy, has great flexibility in
both its political and military capabilities to allow for a
measured response. In short, present day US strategic policy
is for direct and immediate action beginning with political
gestures and escalating to a measured military response
focused on Clausewitz's goals and Jomini's decisive point to
gain domination of the theatre of operations.
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APPENDIX B
DATA USED IN METHODOLOGY DEMONSTRATION
This appendix contains, in table format, the data used for
the methodology demonstration in Chapter IV. The first row of
each table shows the hexagons involved in the reconnaissance
decision for that cycle. The last row reveals the
desirability of sending a reconnaissance asset into a
particular hexagon as computed by the normalization technique.
The largest three values depict those hexagons that were
searched that cycle. The middle six rows contain the raw MOE
data.
Nodes involved in the reconnaissance decision
Ability of reconnaissance asset to detect in a node P(det)
Cycles since last glimpse
Distance from current location of combat unit
Distance from intended path
Inconsistencies between detections within a node
Perception of reconnaissance asset's ability to survive while
in a node
Relative ranks of each hexagon
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TABLE B.l
PROGRAM RUN ONE, CYCLE ONE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
.6 .6 .7 .2 .6 .9 .5 .6 .9
-1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -3 -3 -3
-2 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1
.7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7
1.1 2.7 -3.1 2.6 -2.7 -1.1 1.5
TABLE B.2
PROGRAM RUN ONE, CYCLE TWO
1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9
.7 .6 .6 .2 .6 .9 .5 .6 .9
1 1 1 1 1 1
-1 -2 -1 -2 -2 -1 -3 -3 -2
-2 -2 -1 -2 -1 -1
.9 .7 .7 .7 .7 .9 .7 .7 .5
1.1 -.6 1.7 -2.6 1.6 4.3 -1.3 .3 -2
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TABLE B.3
PROGRAM RUN ONE, CYCLE THREE
TABLE B.4
PROGRAM RUN ONE, CYCLE FOUR
1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9
.7 .6 .6 .7 .2 .9 .5 .6 .9
2 3 3 3 3 2
-2 -2 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
-3 -3 -2 -3 -2 -2 -1 -1
.8 .7 .9 .9 .7 .9 .7 .7 .6
-1.8 -2.5 -1.8 -.2 -1.6 1.7 .8 2.2 1.0
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TABLE B.5
PROGRAM RUN TWO, CYCLE ONE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
.6 .6 .7 .2 .6 .9 .5 .6 .9
-1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -3 -3 -3
-2 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1
.7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7
-3.3 2.2 8.2 -7.5 7 -8.2 -2.2 4.8
TABLE B.6
PROGRAM RUN TWO, CYCLE TWO
1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9
.7 .6 .6 .2 .6 .9 .5 .6 .9
1 1 1 1 1 1
-1 -2 -1 -2 -2 -1 -3 -3 -2
-2 -2 -1 -2 -1 -1
.9 .7 .7 .7 .7 .9 .7 .7 .5
-7.5 -3.3 4.6 -5.3 7.7 7.6 -.9 5.1 -8.3
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TABLE B.7
PROGRAM RUN TWO, CYCLE THREE
1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
.7 .6 .6 .7 .2 .6 .5 .6 .9
1 2 2 2 2 1
-2 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 -2 -1
-2 -2 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1
.9 .7 .7 .9 .7 .9 .7 .5 .5
-5 -3.1 6.9 -5.4 .9 6.6 8.9 -7.9 2
TABLE B.8
PROGRAM RUN TWO, CYCLE FOUR
1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9
.7 .6 .6 .7 .2 .9 .5 .6 .9
2 3 1 3 1 2
-2 -2 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
-3 -2 -2 -3 -1 -3 -1 -2
.8 .7 .9 .9 .7 .9 .9 .5 .6
-4.9 1.3 -2.7 -7.5 7.8 -5.7 5.8 1 2.6
69
TABLE B.9
PROGRAM RUN THREE, CYCLE ONE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
.6 .6 .7 .2 .6 .9 .5 .6 .9
-1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -3 -3 -3
-2 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1
.7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7
-3.3 2.2 8.2 -7.5 7 -8.2 -2.2 4.8
TABLE B.10
PROGRAM RUN THREE, CYCLE TWO
1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
.7 .6 .6 .7 .2 .6 .5 .6 .9
1 1 1 1 1 1
-2 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 -2 -1
-2 -2 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1
.9 .7 .7 .9 .7 .7 .7 .7 .5
-8.2 -4.7 5.3 -4.2 -.7 11.8 .8 7.8 -5.2
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TABLE B.ll
PROGRAM RUN FOUR, CYCLE ONE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
.6 .6 .7 .2 .6 .9 .5 .6 .9
-1 -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -3 -3 -3
-2 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1
.7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7
-3.3 2.2 8.2 -7.5 7 -8.2 -2.2 4.8
TABLE B.12
PROGRAM RUN FOUR, CYCLE TWO
1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9
.7 .6 .6 .2 .6 .9 .5 .6 .9
1 1 1 1 1 1
-1 -2 -1 -2 -2 -1 -3 -3 -2
-2 -2 -1 -2 -1 -1
.9 .7 .7 .7 .7 .9 .7 .7 .5
-4.4 -3.3 4.6 -5.3 7.7 7.6 -.9 5.1 -8.3
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TABLE B.13
PROGRAM RUN FOUR, CYCLE THREE
1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
.7 .6 .6 .7 .2 .6 .5 .6 .9
1 2 2 2 2 1
-2 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1 -2 -2 -1
-2 -2 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1
.9 .7 .7 .9 .7 .9 .7 .5 .5
-5
-3.1 6.9 -5.4 .9 6.6 2.4 -1.4 2
TABLE B.14
PROGRAM RUN FOUR, CYCLE FOUR
1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9
.7 .6 .6 .7 .2 .9 .5 .6 .9
2 3 1 3 1 2
-2 -2 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
-3 -3 -2 -3 -2 -2 -1 -1
.8 .7 .9 .9 .7 .9 .9 .5 .6
-4.9 -3.2 -2.7 -7.5 3.3 -1.2 1.3 5.5 7.1
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APPENDIX C
NORMALIZATION PROGRAM IN APL [REF. 6]
This appendix contains the computer code used to perforin
the normalization technique in Chapter IV. The inputs consist
of the six by nine MOE matrix and a six element vector
representing the weighting scheme. The output is a nine
element vector revealing the utility of reconnaissance in each
operating area.































MEAN- (+/M0E[ ROW; ] ) +COLUMNS
STANDEV-((+/(M0E[R0W; ]-MEAN) *2) +-1+COLUMNS) *0.
5
-12+2xSTANDEV=0
NORMAL [ROW; ] -0
-16











NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF NORMALIZATION
Cycle two of program run two is used to demonstrate the
mathematics involved in the normalization process. The first
row of each table shows the nine areas available for
reconnaissance operations. Underneath each operating area are
listed the six rows for each MOE. The values in the first
table show the raw MOEs. The second table shows the
normalized MOEs after subtracting the mean and dividing by the
standard deviation. These two values are supplied in the
tenth and eleventh columns. The third table shows these
values after multiplication by the weighting scheme in the
form of a column vector with the values (1, 4, 2, 5, 1, 2).
The final table is the vector showing the utility of directing
reconnaissance operations to each of the operating areas. In
order from highest to lowest, they area ranked: (5, 6, 8, 2,




1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 H o
.7 .6 .6 .2 .6 .9 .5 .6 .9 .6 .2
1 1 1 1 1 1 .7 .5
-1 -2 -1 -2 -2 -1 -3 -3 -2 -1.9 .8
-2 -2 -1 -2 -1 -1 -1.0 .9
.9 .7 .7 .7 .7 .9 .7 .7 .5 .7 .1
TABLE D.2
NORMALIZED VALUES
1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9
.5 -2 1.5 -.5 1.5
-1.4 .6 .6 .6 .6 -1.4 .6 .6 -1.4
1.1 -.1 1.1 -.1 -.1 1.1 -1.4 -1.4 -.1




IMPACT OF WEIGHTING SCHEME
1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9
.5 -2 1.5 -.5 1.5
-5.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 -5.6 2.4 2.4 -5.6
1.1 -.2 2.2 -.2 -.2 2.2 -2.8 -2.8 -.2
-5.5 -5.5 -5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
2 4 -4
TABLE D.4
COMPUTED UTILITY FOR EACH AREA
1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9
-7.5 -3.3 4.6 -5.3 7.7 7.6 -.9 5.1 -8.3
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